chore: init

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Job79 committed 2026-11-15 15:52:10 +01:00
commit 9245b26500
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# Firewall: drop all incoming traffic except replies, loopback, ICMP, DHCPv6 and ssh, and forward
# nothing (rootless podman's networks live in Claude's own network namespace). Loaded by
# nftables.service.
destroy table inet firewall
table inet firewall {
chain input {
type filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;
ct state established,related accept
ct state invalid drop
iif lo accept
meta l4proto { icmp, ipv6-icmp } accept
ip6 saddr fe80::/10 udp dport 546 accept
tcp dport 22 accept
}
chain forward {
type filter hook forward priority filter; policy drop;
}
}
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# Grow the /var partition to fill the disk at boot (systemd-repart); x-systemd.growfs in /etc/fstab
# then grows its filesystem.
[Partition]
Type=var
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# Kernel hardening, mostly the KSPP recommendations (Talos sets these too), and one limit raised
# for containers. Left out on purpose: user.max_user_namespaces=0 breaks rootless podman, and
# kernel.modules_disabled=1 breaks loading the network modules podman needs.
# Hide kernel addresses (they help exploits bypass KASLR), even from root.
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
# Only root may read the kernel log; it leaks addresses.
kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
# No perf events for non-root users.
kernel.perf_event_paranoid = 3
# Harden the BPF JIT against JIT spraying.
net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2
# No BPF for non-root users, and no switching it back on at runtime.
kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1
# No kexec: no booting another kernel past Secure Boot.
kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1
# No core dumps of setuid programs; they can hold secrets.
fs.suid_dumpable = 0
# No loading TTY line disciplines on demand; old ones had exploitable bugs.
dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 0
# userfaultfd only for root; it makes kernel race exploits reliable.
vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd = 0
# No opening FIFOs and files owned by others in sticky directories like /tmp.
fs.protected_fifos = 2
fs.protected_regular = 2
# ptrace only on your own descendants.
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1
# Containers (file watchers, systemd in containers) run out of Fedora's 128 inotify instances
# per user; 8192 is common on Kubernetes nodes.
fs.inotify.max_user_instances = 8192
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# DHCP on the real network cards. Kind=!* skips virtual links.
[Match]
Type=ether
Kind=!*
[Network]
DHCP=yes
[DHCPv4]
# The hostname is the one asked at setup (agent-boot), not the DHCP server's.
UseHostname=no
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# Services enabled in the image (mkosi runs systemctl preset-all). Fedora disables getty@.service, the
# login on the screen (tty1, and tty2-6 through its autovt@ alias); this file sorts first, so it wins.
enable systemd-networkd.service
enable systemd-resolved.service
enable systemd-oomd.service
enable nftables.service
enable sshd.service
enable getty@.service
enable agent-setup@.service tty1 ttyS0
enable etc-shadow.mount
enable agent-boot.service
enable claude-remote.path
enable systemd-sysupdate-update.timer
enable systemd-sysupdate-reboot.timer
# Fedora enables these, but they do nothing here: no PAM or crypto changes on a read-only /etc,
# no system or config extensions.
disable authselect-apply-changes.service
disable fips-crypto-policy-overlay.service
disable systemd-sysext.service
disable systemd-confext.service
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# Applies the setup answers at every boot (see /usr/libexec/agent-boot). Before the setup is done
# there are none; agent-setup starts this when it is.
[Unit]
Description=Apply agent setup
ConditionPathExists=/var/lib/agent/hostname
After=systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service
Before=sshd.service claude-remote.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
RemainAfterExit=yes
ExecStart=/usr/libexec/agent-boot
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
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# First boot: asks for the root password, hostname and ssh key, on the screen (tty1) and the serial
# console (ttyS0) at once; whichever is answered first stops the other.
[Unit]
Description=Agent first-boot setup on %I
ConditionPathExists=!/var/lib/agent/hostname
After=systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service
Before=getty@%i.service serial-getty@%i.service
[Service]
Type=oneshot
ExecStart=/usr/libexec/agent-setup
StandardInput=tty
StandardOutput=tty
TTYPath=/dev/%I
TTYReset=yes
TTYVHangup=yes
# Answering on one console stops the setup on the other (SIGTERM), which is no failure.
SuccessExitStatus=SIGTERM
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
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# Starts Claude (Remote Control) once it is logged in: at boot, or when the user first logs in.
[Unit]
Description=Start Claude Remote Control once logged in
[Path]
PathExists=/var/lib/agent/claude/.credentials.json
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target
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# Claude Code, in the background, controlled from claude.ai/code or the Claude app (Remote Control).
# Works in Claude's home. Started by claude-remote.path once Claude is logged in.
[Unit]
Description=Claude Code Remote Control
Wants=network-online.target user@1000.service
After=network-online.target user@1000.service agent-boot.service
[Service]
User=claude
WorkingDirectory=~
# In user.slice, so systemd-oomd kills it (or Claude's containers), not the system (user.slice.d).
Slice=user.slice
Environment=CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=/var/lib/agent/claude XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000
ExecStart=/usr/bin/claude remote-control --name %H
Restart=always
RestartSec=10s
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# The root password. /etc is read-only, so agent-setup writes the shadow file to /var and this
# mounts it over /etc/shadow.
[Unit]
Description=Root password from /var
ConditionPathExists=/var/lib/agent/etc/shadow
RequiresMountsFor=/var
[Mount]
What=/var/lib/agent/etc/shadow
Where=/etc/shadow
Options=bind
[Install]
WantedBy=local-fs.target
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# Load our firewall (/usr/lib/agent/firewall.nft) instead of /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf.
[Service]
ExecStart=
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/nft -f /usr/lib/agent/firewall.nft
ExecReload=
ExecReload=/usr/sbin/nft -f /usr/lib/agent/firewall.nft
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# The host key is made by agent-boot, once the setup is done; agent-setup then starts sshd.
[Unit]
After=agent-boot.service
ConditionPathExists=/var/lib/agent/ssh_host_ed25519_key
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# systemd-oomd for Claude and its containers: when they run the VM out of memory, kill the cgroup
# responsible before the VM thrashes on zram swap or the kernel's OOM killer picks sshd.
[Slice]
# Memory pressure above 60% for 30s: kill the cgroup reclaiming the most memory.
ManagedOOMMemoryPressure=kill
# Swap over 90% full: kill the cgroup using the most swap.
ManagedOOMSwap=kill
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# Updates the root filesystem: writes the next version to the unused root partition.
# Verify=yes: SHA256SUMS.gpg must be signed by a key in /usr/lib/systemd/import-pubring.pgp, and
# SHA256SUMS checks each download.
[Transfer]
ProtectVersion=%A
Verify=yes
[Source]
Type=url-file
Path=https://git.plabble.org/api/packages/Job79/generic/agent/latest/
MatchPattern=agent_@v.root-%a.@u.raw.zst
[Target]
Type=partition
Path=auto
MatchPattern=agent_@v
MatchPartitionType=root
PartitionFlags=0
ReadOnly=1
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# Updates the root filesystem's dm-verity hashes, next to 10-root.transfer (see it for Verify=yes).
[Transfer]
ProtectVersion=%A
Verify=yes
[Source]
Type=url-file
Path=https://git.plabble.org/api/packages/Job79/generic/agent/latest/
MatchPattern=agent_@v.root-%a-verity.@u.raw.zst
[Target]
Type=partition
Path=auto
MatchPattern=agent_@v_verity
MatchPartitionType=root-verity
PartitionFlags=0
ReadOnly=1
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# Installs the next UKI, which systemd-boot boots by default. Verify=yes: see 10-root.transfer.
[Transfer]
ProtectVersion=%A
Verify=yes
[Source]
Type=url-file
Path=https://git.plabble.org/api/packages/Job79/generic/agent/latest/
MatchPattern=agent_@v.efi
[Target]
Type=regular-file
Path=/EFI/Linux
PathRelativeTo=boot
MatchPattern=agent_@v.efi
Mode=0444
InstancesMax=2
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# The user Claude runs as; /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid give it the ids of rootless podman.
u claude 1000 "Claude" /var/home/claude /bin/bash
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# State kept across reboots: the setup answers, the ssh host key and Claude's login
# (agent-boot wipes the rest of Claude's config).
d /var/lib/agent 0755 root root -
d /var/lib/agent/claude 0700 claude claude -
# Wiped at every boot (D empties a directory at boot): Claude's home, with its podman storage, and
# temporary files. These, /tmp and Claude's config are all that Claude can write.
D /var/home/claude 0700 claude claude -
D /var/tmp 1777 root root -
# Start Claude's user manager at boot, for rootless podman and its own services.
f /var/lib/systemd/linger/claude