chore: simplify image configuration
Drop the custom firewall, PS1, oomd and nftables overrides, trim sysctl settings, and add the Secure Boot certificate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
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# Firewall: drop all incoming traffic except replies, loopback, ICMP, DHCPv6 and ssh, and forward
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# nothing (rootless podman's networks live in Claude's own network namespace). Loaded by
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# nftables.service.
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destroy table inet firewall
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table inet firewall {
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chain input {
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type filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;
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ct state established,related accept
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ct state invalid drop
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iif lo accept
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meta l4proto { icmp, ipv6-icmp } accept
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ip6 saddr fe80::/10 udp dport 546 accept
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tcp dport 22 accept
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}
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chain forward {
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type filter hook forward priority filter; policy drop;
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}
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}
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@@ -1,31 +1,3 @@
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# Kernel hardening, mostly the KSPP recommendations (Talos sets these too), and one limit raised
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# for containers. Left out on purpose: user.max_user_namespaces=0 breaks rootless podman, and
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# kernel.modules_disabled=1 breaks loading the network modules podman needs.
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# Hide kernel addresses (they help exploits bypass KASLR), even from root.
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kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
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# Only root may read the kernel log; it leaks addresses.
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kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
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# No perf events for non-root users.
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kernel.perf_event_paranoid = 3
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# Harden the BPF JIT against JIT spraying.
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net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2
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# No BPF for non-root users, and no switching it back on at runtime.
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kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1
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# No kexec: no booting another kernel past Secure Boot.
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kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1
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# No core dumps of setuid programs; they can hold secrets.
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fs.suid_dumpable = 0
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# No loading TTY line disciplines on demand; old ones had exploitable bugs.
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dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 0
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# userfaultfd only for root; it makes kernel race exploits reliable.
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vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd = 0
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# No opening FIFOs and files owned by others in sticky directories like /tmp.
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fs.protected_fifos = 2
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fs.protected_regular = 2
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# ptrace only on your own descendants.
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kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1
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# Containers (file watchers, systemd in containers) run out of Fedora's 128 inotify instances
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# per user; 8192 is common on Kubernetes nodes.
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fs.inotify.max_user_instances = 8192
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@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@
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# login on the screen (tty1, and tty2-6 through its autovt@ alias); this file sorts first, so it wins.
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enable systemd-networkd.service
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enable systemd-resolved.service
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enable systemd-oomd.service
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enable nftables.service
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enable sshd.service
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enable getty@.service
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enable agent-setup@.service tty1 ttyS0
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@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ After=network-online.target user@1000.service agent-boot.service
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[Service]
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User=claude
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WorkingDirectory=~
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# In user.slice, so systemd-oomd kills it (or Claude's containers), not the system (user.slice.d).
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Slice=user.slice
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Environment=CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=/var/lib/agent/claude XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000
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ExecStart=/usr/bin/claude remote-control --name %H
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Restart=always
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@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
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# Load our firewall (/usr/lib/agent/firewall.nft) instead of /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf.
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[Service]
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ExecStart=
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ExecStart=/usr/sbin/nft -f /usr/lib/agent/firewall.nft
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ExecReload=
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ExecReload=/usr/sbin/nft -f /usr/lib/agent/firewall.nft
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@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
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# systemd-oomd for Claude and its containers: when they run the VM out of memory, kill the cgroup
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# responsible before the VM thrashes on zram swap or the kernel's OOM killer picks sshd.
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[Slice]
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# Memory pressure above 60% for 30s: kill the cgroup reclaiming the most memory.
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ManagedOOMMemoryPressure=kill
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# Swap over 90% full: kill the cgroup using the most swap.
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ManagedOOMSwap=kill
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@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
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# Installs the next UKI, which systemd-boot boots by default. Verify=yes: see 10-root.transfer.
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# It gets three tries (boot counting, the +@l-@d in its name; no Mode=0444, systemd-boot can't
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# rename a read-only file): systemd-bless-boot marks it good once a boot gets through
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# (boot-complete.target); if none does, systemd-boot goes back to the previous UKI, and with it
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# the previous root partition (each UKI holds its root hash).
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[Transfer]
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ProtectVersion=%A
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Verify=yes
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@@ -12,6 +16,7 @@ MatchPattern=agent_@v.efi
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Type=regular-file
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Path=/EFI/Linux
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PathRelativeTo=boot
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MatchPattern=agent_@v.efi
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Mode=0444
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MatchPattern=agent_@v+@l-@d.efi agent_@v+@l.efi agent_@v.efi
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TriesLeft=3
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TriesDone=0
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InstancesMax=2
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