chore: simplify image configuration
Drop the custom firewall, PS1, oomd and nftables overrides, trim sysctl settings, and add the Secure Boot certificate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1,31 +1,3 @@
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# Kernel hardening, mostly the KSPP recommendations (Talos sets these too), and one limit raised
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# for containers. Left out on purpose: user.max_user_namespaces=0 breaks rootless podman, and
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# kernel.modules_disabled=1 breaks loading the network modules podman needs.
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# Hide kernel addresses (they help exploits bypass KASLR), even from root.
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kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
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# Only root may read the kernel log; it leaks addresses.
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kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
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# No perf events for non-root users.
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kernel.perf_event_paranoid = 3
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# Harden the BPF JIT against JIT spraying.
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net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2
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# No BPF for non-root users, and no switching it back on at runtime.
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kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1
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# No kexec: no booting another kernel past Secure Boot.
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kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1
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# No core dumps of setuid programs; they can hold secrets.
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fs.suid_dumpable = 0
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# No loading TTY line disciplines on demand; old ones had exploitable bugs.
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dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 0
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# userfaultfd only for root; it makes kernel race exploits reliable.
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vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd = 0
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# No opening FIFOs and files owned by others in sticky directories like /tmp.
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fs.protected_fifos = 2
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fs.protected_regular = 2
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# ptrace only on your own descendants.
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kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1
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# Containers (file watchers, systemd in containers) run out of Fedora's 128 inotify instances
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# per user; 8192 is common on Kubernetes nodes.
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fs.inotify.max_user_instances = 8192
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