chore: simplify image configuration

Drop the custom firewall, PS1, oomd and nftables overrides, trim sysctl
settings, and add the Secure Boot certificate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Job79andClaude Opus 5.5 committed 2026-11-16 19:40:51 +01:00
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commit bbd0364792
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+7 -2
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@@ -19,11 +19,16 @@ jobs:
AUTH: "Authorization: token ${{ github.token }}" AUTH: "Authorization: token ${{ github.token }}"
steps: steps:
- name: Install tools - name: Install tools
run: dnf install -yq mkosi run: dnf install -yq mkosi sbsigntools
- name: Check out - name: Check out
uses: builtin:checkout uses: builtin:checkout
# Signs systemd-boot and the UKI for Secure Boot (mkosi.conf, [Validation]).
- name: Build - name: Build
run: mkosi build env:
KEY: ${{ secrets.SECUREBOOT_KEY }}
run: |
(umask 077 && printf '%s\n' "$KEY" > mkosi.key)
mkosi build
- name: Compress - name: Compress
working-directory: mkosi.output working-directory: mkosi.output
run: | run: |
+2
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@@ -1,2 +1,4 @@
# Build outputs. # Build outputs.
mkosi.output/ mkosi.output/
# The Secure Boot private key (the SECUREBOOT_KEY secret); mkosi.crt is its certificate.
mkosi.key
+8 -5
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@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@ A VM that runs [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) in the background,
- **Resets at reboot:** the OS is read-only, so Claude can't change it, and Claude's home, `/tmp` and all containers are wiped at every boot. Only the setup answers and Claude's login survive (`/var/lib/agent`). - **Resets at reboot:** the OS is read-only, so Claude can't change it, and Claude's home, `/tmp` and all containers are wiped at every boot. Only the setup answers and Claude's login survive (`/var/lib/agent`).
- **Claude as non-root, tools in containers:** Claude runs as the user `claude`, without root, and runs its toolchains in containers with rootless podman (also as `docker`). `/etc/claude-code/CLAUDE.md` tells it about the machine; `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json` lets it run without asking permission. The host has only git, ssh and basic command-line tools. - **Claude as non-root, tools in containers:** Claude runs as the user `claude`, without root, and runs its toolchains in containers with rootless podman (also as `docker`). `/etc/claude-code/CLAUDE.md` tells it about the machine; `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json` lets it run without asking permission. The host has only git, ssh and basic command-line tools.
- **Self-updating:** like [git-runner-mkosi](../git-runner-mkosi): images are rebuilt weekly (also picking up the latest Claude Code) and on every push. Hosts download updates with systemd-sysupdate, check their signature (`SIGNING_KEY` secret), write them into a second root partition (A/B) and reboot into them daily at about 04:10. That reboot also resets Claude's work. - **Self-updating:** like [git-runner-mkosi](../git-runner-mkosi): images are rebuilt weekly (also picking up the latest Claude Code) and on every push. Hosts download updates with systemd-sysupdate, check their signature (`SIGNING_KEY` secret), write them into a second root partition (A/B) and reboot into them daily at about 04:10. That reboot also resets Claude's work. A new version gets three tries to boot; if none gets through, systemd-boot goes back to the previous one.
- **Read-only system:** systemd-boot starts a UKI that mounts the root filesystem, /etc and /usr included, from a read-only erofs partition checked by dm-verity. All state (Claude's home, its login, the root password, logs) lives on `/var`, its own partition. - **Read-only system:** systemd-boot starts a UKI that mounts the root filesystem, /etc and /usr included, from a read-only erofs partition checked by dm-verity. All state (Claude's home, its login, the root password, logs) lives on `/var`, its own partition.
- **Hardened:** a firewall that drops all incoming traffic but ssh, KSPP sysctls and kernel arguments, and systemd-oomd kills Claude's work, not the system, when it runs the VM out of memory. - **Secure Boot:** systemd-boot and the UKIs are signed with our own key (`mkosi.crt`; the private key is the `SECUREBOOT_KEY` secret). systemd-boot enrolls it at first boot if the VM's firmware has no keys yet; the firmware then boots nothing else.
## Install ## Install
Download [the disk image](https://git.plabble.org/api/packages/Job79/generic/agent/latest/agent.qcow2) (built by the `os` workflow), resize it to the disk size you want (/var grows to fill it) and boot it with UEFI. The screen and the serial console ask for a root password, a hostname and an ssh public key for the user `claude`. Download [the disk image](https://git.plabble.org/api/packages/Job79/generic/agent/latest/agent.qcow2) (built by the `os` workflow), resize it to the disk size you want (/var grows to fill it) and boot it with UEFI in Secure Boot setup mode (no keys enrolled; in Proxmox, an EFI disk with "Pre-Enroll keys" unchecked), so it enrolls our key. The screen and the serial console ask for a root password, a hostname and an ssh public key for the user `claude`.
Then log Claude in once: Then log Claude in once:
@@ -29,11 +29,14 @@ As soon as Claude is logged in, `claude-remote.service` starts `claude remote-co
mkosi build mkosi build
``` ```
`mkosi.output/` then holds the disk image (`agent_<version>.raw`), and the UKI and root partitions that the `os` workflow publishes as an update. To boot the disk image (needs `qemu-kvm-core edk2-ovmf`; ssh on port 2222): The build signs with `mkosi.key`: the `SECUREBOOT_KEY` secret, or for a local test a key of your own (`mkosi genkey` writes `mkosi.key` and `mkosi.crt`; don't commit them).
`mkosi.output/` then holds the disk image (`agent_<version>.raw`), and the UKI and root partitions that the `os` workflow publishes as an update. To boot the disk image with Secure Boot (needs `qemu-kvm-core edk2-ovmf`; `OVMF_VARS.fd` has no keys, so it enrolls ours; ssh on port 2222):
```sh ```sh
qemu-img convert -O qcow2 mkosi.output/agent_<version>.raw test.qcow2 && qemu-img resize test.qcow2 40G qemu-img convert -O qcow2 mkosi.output/agent_<version>.raw test.qcow2 && qemu-img resize test.qcow2 40G
cp /usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd vars.fd cp /usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd vars.fd
qemu-kvm -m 8G -smp 4 -cpu host -nic user,model=virtio-net-pci,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 -drive file=test.qcow2,if=virtio -device virtio-balloon-pci,free-page-reporting=on \ qemu-kvm -m 8G -smp 4 -cpu host -nic user,model=virtio-net-pci,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 -drive file=test.qcow2,if=virtio -device virtio-balloon-pci,free-page-reporting=on \
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file=/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.fd -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=vars.fd -machine q35,smm=on -global driver=cfi.pflash01,property=secure,value=on \
-drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file=/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=vars.fd
``` ```
+10 -7
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@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ Bootloader=systemd-boot
# - systemd-pam login sessions (pam_systemd): Claude's user manager and its # - systemd-pam login sessions (pam_systemd): Claude's user manager and its
# D-Bus, which rootless podman needs # D-Bus, which rootless podman needs
# - openssh-server ssh login for the user (keys only) # - openssh-server ssh login for the user (keys only)
# - nftables-services the firewall
# - zram-generator-defaults compressed swap in RAM # - zram-generator-defaults compressed swap in RAM
# - podman, podman-docker containers, for all of Claude's toolchains (also as docker) # - podman, podman-docker containers, for all of Claude's toolchains (also as docker)
# - git-core, openssh-clients Claude Code uses git; it pushes over ssh # - git-core, openssh-clients Claude Code uses git; it pushes over ssh
@@ -44,7 +43,6 @@ Packages=
shadow-utils shadow-utils
systemd-pam systemd-pam
openssh-server openssh-server
nftables-services
zram-generator-defaults zram-generator-defaults
podman podman
podman-docker podman-docker
@@ -67,7 +65,7 @@ UnifiedKernelImageFormat=%i_%v
# (mkosi.extra/etc/machine-id is empty, so no boot counts as the first), no systemd-firstboot # (mkosi.extra/etc/machine-id is empty, so no boot counts as the first), no systemd-firstboot
# questions (agent-setup asks its own), freeing memory unused for an hour (damon_reclaim, in µs; the # questions (agent-setup asks its own), freeing memory unused for an hour (damon_reclaim, in µs; the
# watermarks make it run whatever memory is free), so the host can take it back (virtio-balloon # watermarks make it run whatever memory is free), so the host can take it back (virtio-balloon
# free page reporting), and KSPP hardening (the last four). # free page reporting).
KernelCommandLine= KernelCommandLine=
console=tty0 console=tty0
console=ttyS0,115200n8 console=ttyS0,115200n8
@@ -79,10 +77,6 @@ KernelCommandLine=
damon_reclaim.wmarks_high=1000 damon_reclaim.wmarks_high=1000
damon_reclaim.wmarks_mid=999 damon_reclaim.wmarks_mid=999
damon_reclaim.wmarks_low=0 damon_reclaim.wmarks_low=0
slab_nomerge
init_on_alloc=1
randomize_kstack_offset=on
page_alloc.shuffle=1
# Kernel modules in the initrd: only what finds and mounts the disks of a VM. # Kernel modules in the initrd: only what finds and mounts the disks of a VM.
KernelInitrdModules= KernelInitrdModules=
virtio_blk virtio_blk
@@ -122,3 +116,12 @@ RemoveFiles=
/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-userdbd.* /usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-userdbd.*
/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-nsresourced.* /usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-nsresourced.*
/usr/lib/systemd/system/sshd-keygen* /usr/lib/systemd/system/sshd-keygen*
[Validation]
# Signs systemd-boot and the UKI for Secure Boot, and puts our keys on the ESP, where systemd-boot
# enrolls them at first boot if the firmware is in setup mode (no keys enrolled; in Proxmox, an EFI
# disk without pre-enrolled keys). mkosi.crt is the certificate; mkosi.key, its private key, is the
# SECUREBOOT_KEY secret of this repository, which the os workflow writes to mkosi.key.
SecureBoot=yes
SecureBootKey=mkosi.key
SecureBootCertificate=mkosi.crt
+18
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@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
-1
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@@ -12,4 +12,3 @@ You run on a small Fedora VM made for you, as the user `claude`, without root.
- **Everything resets at reboot**: your home (/var/home/claude), /tmp and all containers and - **Everything resets at reboot**: your home (/var/home/claude), /tmp and all containers and
images. Only your Claude login survives. Keep results somewhere else (push them to git, for images. Only your Claude login survives. Keep results somewhere else (push them to git, for
example). The VM may reboot at about 04:10 to update. example). The VM may reboot at about 04:10 to update.
- Incoming traffic is blocked except ssh; to serve something, the user needs a tunnel.
-2
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@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
# The prompt: hostname and directory on a purple bar (the arrow needs a Powerline/Nerd font).
export PS1="\[\e[30;45m\] \h | \w \[\e[0;35m\]\[\e[m\] "
-18
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@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
# Firewall: drop all incoming traffic except replies, loopback, ICMP, DHCPv6 and ssh, and forward
# nothing (rootless podman's networks live in Claude's own network namespace). Loaded by
# nftables.service.
destroy table inet firewall
table inet firewall {
chain input {
type filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;
ct state established,related accept
ct state invalid drop
iif lo accept
meta l4proto { icmp, ipv6-icmp } accept
ip6 saddr fe80::/10 udp dport 546 accept
tcp dport 22 accept
}
chain forward {
type filter hook forward priority filter; policy drop;
}
}
@@ -1,31 +1,3 @@
# Kernel hardening, mostly the KSPP recommendations (Talos sets these too), and one limit raised
# for containers. Left out on purpose: user.max_user_namespaces=0 breaks rootless podman, and
# kernel.modules_disabled=1 breaks loading the network modules podman needs.
# Hide kernel addresses (they help exploits bypass KASLR), even from root.
kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
# Only root may read the kernel log; it leaks addresses.
kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
# No perf events for non-root users.
kernel.perf_event_paranoid = 3
# Harden the BPF JIT against JIT spraying.
net.core.bpf_jit_harden = 2
# No BPF for non-root users, and no switching it back on at runtime.
kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled = 1
# No kexec: no booting another kernel past Secure Boot.
kernel.kexec_load_disabled = 1
# No core dumps of setuid programs; they can hold secrets.
fs.suid_dumpable = 0
# No loading TTY line disciplines on demand; old ones had exploitable bugs.
dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 0
# userfaultfd only for root; it makes kernel race exploits reliable.
vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd = 0
# No opening FIFOs and files owned by others in sticky directories like /tmp.
fs.protected_fifos = 2
fs.protected_regular = 2
# ptrace only on your own descendants.
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1
# Containers (file watchers, systemd in containers) run out of Fedora's 128 inotify instances # Containers (file watchers, systemd in containers) run out of Fedora's 128 inotify instances
# per user; 8192 is common on Kubernetes nodes. # per user; 8192 is common on Kubernetes nodes.
fs.inotify.max_user_instances = 8192 fs.inotify.max_user_instances = 8192
@@ -2,8 +2,6 @@
# login on the screen (tty1, and tty2-6 through its autovt@ alias); this file sorts first, so it wins. # login on the screen (tty1, and tty2-6 through its autovt@ alias); this file sorts first, so it wins.
enable systemd-networkd.service enable systemd-networkd.service
enable systemd-resolved.service enable systemd-resolved.service
enable systemd-oomd.service
enable nftables.service
enable sshd.service enable sshd.service
enable getty@.service enable getty@.service
enable agent-setup@.service tty1 ttyS0 enable agent-setup@.service tty1 ttyS0
@@ -8,8 +8,6 @@ After=network-online.target user@1000.service agent-boot.service
[Service] [Service]
User=claude User=claude
WorkingDirectory=~ WorkingDirectory=~
# In user.slice, so systemd-oomd kills it (or Claude's containers), not the system (user.slice.d).
Slice=user.slice
Environment=CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=/var/lib/agent/claude XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000 Environment=CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR=/var/lib/agent/claude XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1000
ExecStart=/usr/bin/claude remote-control --name %H ExecStart=/usr/bin/claude remote-control --name %H
Restart=always Restart=always
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
# Load our firewall (/usr/lib/agent/firewall.nft) instead of /etc/sysconfig/nftables.conf.
[Service]
ExecStart=
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/nft -f /usr/lib/agent/firewall.nft
ExecReload=
ExecReload=/usr/sbin/nft -f /usr/lib/agent/firewall.nft
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
# systemd-oomd for Claude and its containers: when they run the VM out of memory, kill the cgroup
# responsible before the VM thrashes on zram swap or the kernel's OOM killer picks sshd.
[Slice]
# Memory pressure above 60% for 30s: kill the cgroup reclaiming the most memory.
ManagedOOMMemoryPressure=kill
# Swap over 90% full: kill the cgroup using the most swap.
ManagedOOMSwap=kill
@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@
# Installs the next UKI, which systemd-boot boots by default. Verify=yes: see 10-root.transfer. # Installs the next UKI, which systemd-boot boots by default. Verify=yes: see 10-root.transfer.
# It gets three tries (boot counting, the +@l-@d in its name; no Mode=0444, systemd-boot can't
# rename a read-only file): systemd-bless-boot marks it good once a boot gets through
# (boot-complete.target); if none does, systemd-boot goes back to the previous UKI, and with it
# the previous root partition (each UKI holds its root hash).
[Transfer] [Transfer]
ProtectVersion=%A ProtectVersion=%A
Verify=yes Verify=yes
@@ -12,6 +16,7 @@ MatchPattern=agent_@v.efi
Type=regular-file Type=regular-file
Path=/EFI/Linux Path=/EFI/Linux
PathRelativeTo=boot PathRelativeTo=boot
MatchPattern=agent_@v.efi MatchPattern=agent_@v+@l-@d.efi agent_@v+@l.efi agent_@v.efi
Mode=0444 TriesLeft=3
TriesDone=0
InstancesMax=2 InstancesMax=2