feat: unattended setup from credentials, rewrite README
agent-setup takes its answers from the credentials agent.password, agent.hostname and agent.ssh-key when they are given, so a test VM boots without typing. The README is shorter, explains the mkosi layout and shows how to boot a test VM with these credentials. Also uploads the manifest in the os workflow and ignores the test VM files. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -53,6 +53,6 @@ jobs:
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working-directory: mkosi.output
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run: |
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curl -fsS -H "$AUTH" -X DELETE "$PKG" || true
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for f in agent_*.efi agent_*.root-*.raw.zst agent.qcow2 SHA256SUMS.gpg SHA256SUMS; do
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for f in agent_*.efi agent_*.root-*.raw.zst agent.qcow2 agent_*.manifest SHA256SUMS.gpg SHA256SUMS; do
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curl -fsS -o /dev/null -H "$AUTH" --upload-file "$f" "$PKG/$f"
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done
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+2
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@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
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# Ignored files
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#
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# Build output, and the Secure Boot private key (mkosi.conf, [Validation]).
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mkosi.output/
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mkosi.key
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test.qcow2
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vars.fd
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@@ -1,42 +1,42 @@
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# agent-mkosi
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A VM that runs [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) in the background, packaged as a minimal Fedora image built with [mkosi](https://github.com/systemd/mkosi). You control Claude from claude.ai/code, the Claude app (Remote Control), or log in with ssh.
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A VM that runs [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) in the background. It is a minimal Fedora image built with [mkosi](https://github.com/systemd/mkosi). You control Claude from claude.ai/code or the Claude app (Remote Control), or log in with ssh.
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- **Resets at reboot:** the OS is read-only, so Claude can't change it, and Claude's home, `/tmp` and all containers are wiped at every boot. Only the setup answers and Claude's login survive (`/var/lib/agent`).
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- **Claude as non-root, tools in containers:** Claude runs as the user `claude`, without root, and runs its toolchains in containers with rootless podman (also as `docker`). `/etc/claude-code/CLAUDE.md` tells it about the machine; `/etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json` lets it run without asking permission. The host has only git, ssh and basic command-line tools.
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- **Self-updating:** like [git-runner-mkosi](../git-runner-mkosi): images are rebuilt weekly (also picking up the latest Claude Code) and on every push. Hosts download updates with systemd-sysupdate, check their signature (`SIGNING_KEY` secret), write them into a second root partition (A/B) and reboot into them daily at about 04:10. That reboot also resets Claude's work. A new version gets three tries to boot; if none gets through, systemd-boot goes back to the previous one.
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- **Read-only system:** systemd-boot starts a UKI that mounts the root filesystem, /etc and /usr included, from a read-only erofs partition checked by dm-verity. All state (Claude's home, its login, the root password, logs) lives on `/var`, its own partition.
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- **Secure Boot:** systemd-boot and the UKIs are signed with our own key (`mkosi.crt`; the private key is the `SECUREBOOT_KEY` secret). systemd-boot enrolls it at first boot if the VM's firmware has no keys yet; the firmware then boots nothing else.
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- **Resets at reboot:** Claude's home, `/tmp` and all containers are wiped at every boot. Only the setup answers and Claude's login survive (`/var/lib/agent`).
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- **Read-only OS:** the root filesystem is read-only, so Claude can't change the OS. All state lives on `/var`.
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- **Tools in containers:** Claude runs as the user `claude`, without root, and runs its toolchains in containers with podman. The host has only git, ssh and basic command-line tools.
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- **Self-updating:** the `os` rebuilds weekly and updates with systemd-sysupdate.
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## Install
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Download [the disk image](https://git.plabble.org/api/packages/Job79/generic/agent/latest/agent.qcow2) (built by the `os` workflow), resize it to the disk size you want (/var grows to fill it) and boot it with UEFI in Secure Boot setup mode (no keys enrolled; in Proxmox, an EFI disk with "Pre-Enroll keys" unchecked), so it enrolls our key. The screen and the serial console ask for a root password, a hostname and an ssh public key for the user `claude`.
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Download [the disk image](https://git.plabble.org/api/packages/Job79/generic/agent/latest/agent.qcow2), resize it to the disk size you want and boot it with UEFI in Secure Boot setup mode. The console asks for a root password, a hostname and an ssh public key for the user `claude`.
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Then log Claude in once:
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```sh
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ssh claude@<vm>
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claude # trust the folder (your home), then /login with your Claude account
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claude # trust the folder, then /login with your Claude account
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```
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As soon as Claude is logged in, `claude-remote.service` starts `claude remote-control` in Claude's home, and the VM shows up in claude.ai/code and the Claude app under its hostname. Over ssh you can also run `claude` yourself. Logs: `journalctl -u claude-remote`.
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The VM then shows up in claude.ai/code and the Claude app under its hostname.
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## Development
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`mkosi.conf` defines the OS (`mkosi.extra/` is copied to `/`, `mkosi.repart/` is the disk layout, `mkosi.sandbox/` adds the Claude Code package repository). When changing files, follow [STYLE.md](STYLE.md).
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```sh
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mkosi genkey # local test only, CI uses the SECUREBOOT_KEY secret
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mkosi build
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```
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The build signs with `mkosi.key`: the `SECUREBOOT_KEY` secret, or for a local test a key of your own (`mkosi genkey` writes `mkosi.key` and `mkosi.crt`; don't commit them).
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`mkosi.output/` then holds the disk image (`agent_<version>.raw`), and the UKI and root partitions that the `os` workflow publishes as an update. To boot the disk image with Secure Boot (needs `qemu-kvm-core edk2-ovmf`; `OVMF_VARS.fd` has no keys, so it enrolls ours; ssh on port 2222):
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`mkosi.output/` then holds the disk image (`agent_<version>.raw`) and the UKI and root partitions that make up an update. To boot it with Secure Boot (needs `qemu-kvm-core edk2-ovmf`):
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```sh
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qemu-img convert -O qcow2 mkosi.output/agent_<version>.raw test.qcow2 && qemu-img resize test.qcow2 40G
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qemu-img create -f qcow2 -F raw -b $PWD/mkosi.output/agent_<version>.raw test.qcow2 40G
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cp /usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_VARS.fd vars.fd
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qemu-kvm -m 8G -smp 4 -cpu host -nic user,model=virtio-net-pci,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 -drive file=test.qcow2,if=virtio -device virtio-balloon-pci,free-page-reporting=on \
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qemu-kvm -m 8G -cpu host -nographic -nic user,model=virtio-net-pci,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22 -drive file=test.qcow2,if=virtio \
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-machine q35,smm=on -global driver=cfi.pflash01,property=secure,value=on \
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-drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file=/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=vars.fd
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-drive if=pflash,format=raw,readonly=on,file=/usr/share/edk2/ovmf/OVMF_CODE.secboot.fd -drive if=pflash,format=raw,file=vars.fd \
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-smbios type=11,value=io.systemd.credential:agent.password=test \
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-smbios type=11,value=io.systemd.credential.binary:agent.ssh-key=$(base64 -w0 ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub)
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```
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The credentials answer the setup, so it boots straight to a login (root, password `test`) on the serial console. Ctrl-a x quits. Then `ssh -p 2222 claude@localhost`.
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+3
-1
@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ Release=45
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Format=disk
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ImageId=agent
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OutputDirectory=mkosi.output
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# The UKI and root partitions are published as updates (systemd-sysupdate).
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SplitArtifacts=uki,partitions
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# Lists the packages and versions in the image, to tell which builds a CVE
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# affects. .gitea/workflows/os.yml publishes it with the image.
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ManifestFormat=json
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[Content]
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Bootable=yes
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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Before=getty@%i.service serial-getty@%i.service
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[Service]
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Type=oneshot
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ImportCredential=agent.*
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ExecStart=/usr/libexec/agent-setup
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StandardInput=tty
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StandardOutput=tty
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@@ -6,22 +6,35 @@
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# /var/lib/agent. The password goes into a shadow file there, which
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# etc-shadow.mount puts over /etc/shadow. agent-boot applies the rest at every
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# boot.
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#
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# With the credential agent.password, it asks nothing and takes the answers
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# from the credentials agent.password, agent.hostname and agent.ssh-key, such
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# as for a test VM (README.md).
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set -euo pipefail
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echo "== Agent setup =="
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cred() { cat "${CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY:-/nonexistent}/agent.$1" 2>/dev/null; }
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if pw=$(cred password); then
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# Both consoles run this script. Only one may do the setup.
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exec 9>/run/agent-setup.lock
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flock -n 9 || exit 0
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name=$(cred hostname) || true
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key=$(cred ssh-key) || true
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else
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echo "== Agent setup =="
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while :; do
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read -rsp "Root password: " pw; echo
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read -rsp "Again: " pw2; echo
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[[ -n $pw && $pw == "$pw2" ]] && break
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echo "Passwords do not match, try again."
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done
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read -rp "Hostname [agent]: " name
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read -rp "SSH public key for the user claude: " key
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fi
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install -d -m 0700 /var/lib/agent/etc
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cp /etc/passwd /etc/shadow /var/lib/agent/etc/
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echo "root:$pw" | chpasswd --prefix /var/lib/agent
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systemctl start etc-shadow.mount
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read -rp "Hostname [agent]: " name
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read -rp "SSH public key for the user claude: " key
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[[ -n $key ]] && install -m 0644 /dev/stdin /var/lib/agent/authorized_keys <<<"$key"
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# Written last: its presence marks the setup as done.
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echo "${name:-agent}" > /var/lib/agent/hostname
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