The image now holds only the ESP and a verity-protected /usr (A/B). At first boot, systemd-repart in the initrd makes the root filesystem: btrfs, encrypted with a TPM key sealed to the signed PCR 11 policy, with /var as its own subvolume. A TPM is required. systemd.image_policy= accepts only an encrypted root and a verity-checked /usr, and FactoryReset=yes lets factory-reset.target wipe it. /etc is writable but nearly empty: mkosi.finalize keeps the build's /etc in /usr/share/factory/etc and systemd-tmpfiles links it in at boot. That removes etc-shadow.mount, the host key on /var, fstab and /var/lib/agent. /var now survives reboots. systemd-firstboot replaces agent-setup: it asks for the root password on the screen and offers a recovery key. Machines are named agent-???? from the kernel command line. The user is now agent, with its home in /home/agent and ssh keys in the default places. sshd.path starts sshd only once root or agent has a key. The test VM needs swtpm. The package cache moves to a podman volume (AGENTS.md). No existing VMs can update to this layout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
177 lines
6.5 KiB
Plaintext
177 lines
6.5 KiB
Plaintext
# Agent image
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#
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# A Fedora VM image that runs Claude Code in the background. mkosi.extra/ is
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# copied to /, mkosi.repart/ defines the disk and mkosi.sandbox/ adds the
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# Claude Code package repository. /usr is read-only and replaced whole by
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# updates. The root filesystem holds the state: /var, and an /etc that is
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# mostly links into /usr (mkosi.finalize). Claude can't change the OS, so it
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# runs its tools in containers.
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# mkosi.extra/etc/claude-code/ sets Claude Code up for that:
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# managed-settings.json lets it run without permission prompts, and CLAUDE.md
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# tells it about this machine.
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[Distribution]
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Distribution=fedora
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Release=45
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[Output]
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Format=disk
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ImageId=agent
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OutputDirectory=mkosi.output
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SplitArtifacts=uki,partitions
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# ManifestFormat lists the packages and versions in the image, to tell which
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# builds a CVE affects. .gitea/workflows/os.yml publishes it with the image.
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ManifestFormat=json
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[Content]
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Bootable=yes
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Bootloader=systemd-boot
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# Packages is systemd with its network services, plus:
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# - kernel-core has no drivers or firmware beyond what VMs need.
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# - systemd-container has systemd-pull, which systemd-sysupdate downloads with.
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# - gnupg2 checks the signature of updates.
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# - systemd-boot-unsigned is the boot loader, which mkosi signs.
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# - util-linux and shadow-utils give the console login, the setup and
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# newuidmap for rootless podman.
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# - systemd-pam gives login sessions: Claude's user manager and its D-Bus,
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# which rootless podman needs.
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# - openssh-server lets you log in with ssh keys.
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# - zram-generator-defaults sets up compressed swap in RAM.
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# - podman and podman-docker run Claude's toolchains in containers.
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# - claude-code comes from mkosi.sandbox/etc/yum.repos.d.
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# - git-core and openssh-clients let Claude Code use git and push over ssh.
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# - The rest are basic command-line tools Claude uses on the host.
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Packages=
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kernel-core
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systemd
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dbus-broker
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systemd-udev
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systemd-networkd
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systemd-resolved
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systemd-container
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gnupg2
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systemd-boot-unsigned
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util-linux
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shadow-utils
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systemd-pam
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openssh-server
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zram-generator-defaults
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podman
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podman-docker
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claude-code
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git-core
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openssh-clients
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curl
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tar
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gzip
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xz
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zstd
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diffutils
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findutils
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procps-ng
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iproute
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WithDocs=no
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Locale=C.UTF-8
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# UnifiedKernelImageFormat names UKIs the way systemd-sysupdate names the ones
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# it installs.
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UnifiedKernelImageFormat=%i_%v
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# KernelCommandLine sets:
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# - console= shows the console on the serial port and the screen. The last
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# one, the screen, is /dev/console, where systemd-firstboot asks for the root
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# password at first boot.
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# - rw mounts the root filesystem writable. The initrd finds it by its
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# partition type (mkosi.extra/usr/lib/repart.d/50-root.conf).
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# - systemd.hostname= names each machine agent- and four hex digits from its
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# machine ID, from the initrd on. It wins over /etc/hostname, so hostnamectl
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# renames only until the next boot.
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# - systemd.image_policy= makes the initrd use only an encrypted root
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# filesystem (or none yet, at first boot) and a verity-checked /usr.
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# Otherwise someone with the disk could put in a plain root filesystem with
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# their own /etc. Our UKI would boot it, and with PCR 11 unchanged, their
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# code could unseal the key of the real one.
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# - SYSTEMD_DEFAULT_MOUNT_RATE_LIMIT_BURST lets systemd handle more mount
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# changes per second. At the default of 5, it holds back mounts at boot and
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# delays / and /usr by up to a second each. The kernel passes it to systemd
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# as environment.
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KernelCommandLine=
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console=ttyS0,115200n8
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console=tty0
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quiet
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rw
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systemd.hostname=agent-????
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systemd.image_policy=root=encrypted+absent:usr=verity:esp=unprotected
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SYSTEMD_DEFAULT_MOUNT_RATE_LIMIT_BURST=50
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# KernelInitrdModules are the modules the initrd needs to find the disks of a
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# VM, mount /usr and make, unlock and mount the root filesystem.
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KernelInitrdModules=
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virtio_blk
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virtio_scsi
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sd_mod
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nvme
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tpm_tis
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tpm_crb
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dm-verity
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dm-crypt
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erofs
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btrfs
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# KernelModules keeps all modules but the hardware drivers, then the drivers a
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# VM needs (disks, network, screen) and those of rootless podman's networks
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# (pasta). The last matching line wins. Keyboard, USB and a basic screen are
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# built into the kernel.
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KernelModules=
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/*
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-/drivers/*
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/drivers/virtio/*
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/drivers/block/*
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/drivers/md/*
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nvme
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virtio_scsi
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sd_mod
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virtio_net
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qemu_fw_cfg
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bochs
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virtio-gpu
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veth
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tun
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# RemoveFiles drops what the image doesn't use:
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# - System.map is only for debugging the kernel.
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# - The udev hwdb holds hardware names and quirks, nothing a VM needs.
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# - homed, userdbd and nsresourced are unused services.
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RemoveFiles=
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/usr/lib/modules/*/System.map
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/usr/lib/udev/hwdb.bin
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/usr/lib/udev/hwdb.d
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/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-homed*
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/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-userdbd.*
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/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-nsresourced.*
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[Validation]
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# SecureBoot signs systemd-boot and the UKI, and puts our keys on the ESP.
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# systemd-boot enrolls them at first boot if the firmware is in setup mode (no
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# keys enrolled; in Proxmox, an EFI disk without pre-enrolled keys). mkosi.key
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# is the SECUREBOOT_KEY secret, which .gitea/workflows/os.yml writes.
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SecureBoot=yes
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SecureBootKey=mkosi.key
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SecureBootCertificate=mkosi.crt
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# SignExpectedPcr signs the PCR 11 values that each UKI will measure, with
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# mkosi.key. The TPM then unlocks the root filesystem only for UKIs we signed,
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# also after updates (mkosi.extra/usr/lib/repart.d/50-root.conf).
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SignExpectedPcr=yes
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[Runtime]
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# Runtime sets up the test VM of mkosi vm (AGENTS.md). Ephemeral boots a copy,
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# so test runs don't change the built image. Credentials sets the root
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# password, and systemd.firstboot=no skips the questions at first boot, such
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# as the offer of a recovery key. mkosi ssh logs in as root with mkosi.key,
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# which mkosi also authorizes for root in the VM.
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Ephemeral=yes
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CPUs=4
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RAM=8G
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RuntimeSize=40G
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# QemuArgs joins the serial port to the console mkosi vm shows (hvc0). The UKI
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# doesn't use hvc0: with Secure Boot, systemd-stub ignores the console= mkosi
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# passes.
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QemuArgs=-serial chardev:console
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Credentials=passwd.plaintext-password.root=root
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KernelCommandLineExtra=systemd.firstboot=no
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